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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of 
interest groups on the Indian development effort since 
independence. The theoretical framework used is Mancur 
Olson's theory that coalitions organize to influence 
government policy and the market system to secure benefits 
for themselves, impacting productivity and ultimately the 
evolution of society itself.
The Indian case study is carried out by examining two 
important areas of planned economic growth: the state and 
agriculture. In each of these sectors a network of 
understanding has been established between the educated, 
social and economic elites to share the benefits of 
development among themselves. The poor who, with little 
social standing, depend almost exclusively on the existing 
power structure to represent their interests, have been left 
out of this arrangement.
There is evidence to show that interest group action in 
India has resulted in the consolidation of vested interests 
and a thriving black market in a stagnant economy. As Olson 
predicted, this is quite different from the evolution of a 
rapidly growing economy and egalitarian society that 
economic planners had envisaged.
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The Political Economy in India: Interest Groups and
Development (1947-1990)
Introduction
The following thesis is a case study of the political 
economy of independent India. Its purpose is two-fold. The 
first is to establish that elites of the society have used 
official legislation and regulation in a democratic system 
to further group interests. The second is to show how such 
interest group action has caused economic stagnation and 
encouraged a thriving black market, perpetuating existing 
social disparities and making the existence of the 
underprivileged even more precarious.
Chapter I lays down the theoretical framework of the 
thesis. Mancur Olson's study of coalition action in post- 
World War II western democracies is used to discuss why 
interest groups organize themselves to influence government 
policy and the market. And further, how this interaction 
between the government and interest groups changes the 
direction of social evolution, almost always in an manner 
unfavorable for growth and for the poor. This section also 
identifies the salient features of Olson's theory which are 
distinguishable in the political economy of India. Detailed 
discussion of these attributes will reveal the 
correspondence between theory and evidence. To facilitate 
this, the analysis of the Indian case is divided into two 
parts: the state and the agricultural sector. These two
2
3areas were selected because of their prominent roles in 
determining the direction and pace of economic growth.
Under the prevailing socialist ideology, the state dictates 
every aspect of development and, in an agrarian economy, the 
agricultural sector provides sustenance to the vast majority 
of the population.
Chapter II deals with the state in India. It describes 
the political ideology and economic planning that envisaged 
a socialist direction to the evolution of society. To 
implement such a development strategy, the state was 
empowered with extensive legislative and administrative 
powers in the economy. This provided a strong incentive for 
the formation of a coalition within the state, politicians 
and bureaucrats willing to use official authority to 
manipulate regulations on behalf of the private sector. 
Industrialists and traders have been quick to capitalize on 
this situation and have organized an extensive and growing 
black market, preserving illegal incomes by transferring a 
portion to the state as 'rent1 of post, official positions 
that allow administrators considerable discretion in 
enforcing the law. This understanding among the elites has 
left the poor out in the cold, prices are artificially 
inflated by shortage brokers and for those without much 
purchasing power* this means little or no entitlement in the 
market.
Chapter III reveals the growth of a second interest
4group in the agricultural sector. These are elites who have 
used their social standings to promote themselves in the 
political hierarchy. And, a strong political lobby has 
allowed them to capture substantial economic advantages as 
well. However, such benefits from the political process 
have been at the expense of the poor who have no incentive 
to organize themselves in a similar way. And, with no 
political leverage, they continue to rely almost exclusively 
on the elite-run power structure for representation of their 
interests.
Chapter V concludes by re-identifying the features of 
the Indian political economy that correspond with Olson's 
theory and that have caused society to evolve as he 
predicted. The elites in India have assimilated and used 
their positions to bargain for improvements in their own 
situations. As a result, rather than establishing an 
egalitarian society in a growing economy, state regulation 
that was specifically targeted for the underprivileged has 
actually contributed to the concentration of power and 
wealth under retarded growth.
Chapter I 
The Impact of Interest Groups
In laying the theoretical framework of the following 
discussions, this chapter summarizes Mancur Olson's study of 
coalition groups*1 Olson uses evidence from developed 
countries to illustrate how interest groups influence the 
direction of society, no matter where the process of 
evolution initially started. The following chapters will 
show that evidence from the Indian development effort 
supports Olson's theory and, as he predicted, although 
planned growth was based on a strongly socialist ideology, 
interest group intervention in the implementation of 
policies has actually perpetuated the inequalities of 
society.
Olson's theory begins with the suggestion that groups 
with access to selective incentives will be more likely to 
act together to obtain collective goods than those who do 
not. He argues that in no country are large groups without 
access to selective incentives generally organized: for 
example, there are no organizations for the poor or for 
those with relatively low incomes. By contrast, almost
1Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic
Growth. Stagflation and Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1982).
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everywhere the social prestige of the learned professionals 
and their limited numbers has helped them to organize. 
Moreover, professional organizations are often able to 
determine who is Gjualified to practice the profession and 
thereby they can control that their selective incentive.
Coalitions use their power to influence government 
policy or the market place. These two influences, Olson 
predicts, affect not only efficiency, economic growth and 
the exclusion of entrants into society but, also, the 
relative importance of different institutions and 
activities.
Lobbying by coalitions increases the complexity of 
regulation and the. scope of government by creating special 
provisions and exceptions. The more elaborate the 
regulation, the greater the need for specialists to deal 
with them, such as lawyers, accountants or other 
consultants. When these specialists become significant 
enough, there is even the possibility that specialists with 
a vested interest in complex regulations will collude or 
lobby against the simplification or elimination of the 
regulations. Also, someone has to administer the 
increasingly complex regulations that result from lobbying. 
This increases the scope of both bureaucracy and government 
Olson labels this interaction as 'complex understandings' 
among the various agents.
Olson argues that the growth of coalitions with an
7incentive to try to capture a larger share of national 
income and, the increase in regulatory complexity and 
governmental action this encourages, alters the pattern of 
incentives and the direction of evolution in a society. 
Increases in the payoffs from lobbying and cartel activity, 
as compared with the payoffs from production, means more 
resources are devoted to politics and cartel activity and 
fewer devoted to production. The incentive to produce is 
diminished while the incentive to seek a larger share of 
what is produced increases. These changes in the pattern of 
incentives deflects the direction of society's evolution. 
Olson further suggests that in such an environment, the poor 
and unemployed with no incentives to enable them to organize 
will suffer the most. "Every society, whatever its 
institutions and governing ideology, gives the greatest 
rewards to the fittest-the fittest for that society...(B)ut 
no society rewards those who are least fit to thrive under 
its arrangements."2
In India, development was initiated by the formulation 
of an exhaustive economic plan that closely adhered to the 
professed socialist ideology of the government. There were 
two features of underlying importance in this plan. First, 
to ensure rapid economic growth, the state had to assume 
responsibility as the initiator and controller of all 
economic activity. Second, the benefits of state guided
2Ibid., 74.
8growth were to accrue increasingly to the less privileged of 
society. To realize a reduction in inequalities, economic 
policy was accompanied by extensive regulations and policy 
instruments to prevent the concentration of power and 
wealth. From this initial situation four attributes of 
Olson's theory may be identified: an explicitly desired 
direction to the evolution of society, complex official 
regulations, 'specialists' associated with such regulation 
and the selective incentives accessible to these 
specialists.
First, nationalist leaders attempted to pave the way 
toward an egalitarian, socialist society. This was the 
direction planned economic growth was to take. Second, the 
plan itself established a complexity of regulations in the 
economy at the very start of the development process.
Third, to implement these regulations, a large and 
authoritative bureaucracy was appointed. Along with 
politicians, they were the 'specialists' equipped to deal 
with the elaborate red tape of a highly regulated economy. 
Finally, in addition to the power and prestige this gave 
politicians and bureaucrats, it also provided them with the 
opportunity to earn illegal incomes. This was the set of 
special incentives accessible to the elites.
Later chapters will show how the 'specialists' have 
used their positions to preserve and enhance their own 
interests. Clive Crook suggests that in Indian industry, it
is often more important to know which strings to pull than 
any business skills.3 The extent of regulations imposed on 
private industry has prompted business houses and trading 
establishments to use their financial power to escape 
legislation via special provisions and exceptions. This has 
been the foundation of the illegal incomes commanded by 
bureaucrats and politicians for their specialized skills in 
dealing with official restrictions. There is, therefore, a 
reluctance to change the status quo and the state continues 
to endorse complex industrial regulations. The elites have 
further guarded their selective incentives and limited entry 
into the profession by supporting a bias toward higher 
education in the education policy of a country where over 
3 0% are illiterate.4 In agriculture, where the majority of 
the votes come from in any election, elites have used their 
position to capture political prominence and strong 
bargaining power at all levels of government.5 They have 
successfully lobbied to secure concessions and subsidies for 
the sector in the name of the rural poor. In reality, these 
have been pre-empted by the dominating classes to enhance 
their own economic well-being.
3Clive Crook, "Body Politics," Economist. 4 May 
1991, p. S8.
4Ibid., S15.
5Over 60% of the population is employed in 
agriculture or related activities in the rural sector.
See Michael Todaro, Economic Development in the Third 
World (New York: Longman, 1985), 27.
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In India, as in Olson's theory, the growth of groups 
with selective incentives, regulation complexities and 
government action have had an impact on the pattern of 
incentives and attitudes that have evolved in society. 
Evading or exploiting regulations, politics and the 
bureaucracy and asserting rights through this network has 
become far more important than recognizing one's obligations 
to society. As the rewards of corruption have risen, 
politicians and bureaucrats have been increasingly reluctant 
to revise state regulations and alter the established 
'complex understandings'.
For India, this has meant, as Olson predicted, a 
complete diversion from the envisaged egalitarian society 
with a rapidly expanding economy. Over 40% of the 
population remains below the poverty line and per capita 
income has increased at an overall pace of only 1.6% for the 
decade 1970-8l.6 The poor, without the social standing or 
political clout to come together and assert their rights, 
have suffered the most while the educated elites have 
consolidated their positions; the rural rich have become 
richer? large business houses are stronger and there is a 
thriving black market, even in essential consumer products. 
In fact, the network of understanding among these elites has 
begun to undermine the legitimacy of state authority itself.
6Ibid., 50.
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In the sections below, this thesis will apply Olson's 
ideas to the Indian case and examine in detail the 
vulnerability of the economy to pressures from the political 
economy.
Chapter II 
State Guided Development
In Asian Drama. Gunnar Myrdal argued that a plan for 
development is in essence a political plan; plan-making, 
therefore, is itself a part of the political process in a 
country.7 This chapter highlights three such stages in 
Indian development planning. First, the ideology behind the 
Indian development plan is described. Second, the 
integration of political ideology into planning, the 
development strategy adopted and the policy instruments used 
to implement it are discussed. This process gave the state 
the right to reserve extensive autonomy in public affairs 
and the enormous power that it assigned itself made it 
possible for the state to be not only relatively self­
determining but also self-interested. The third stage 
describes how in exercising this power, politicians and 
bureaucrats have used official authority to promote and 
safeguard their own interests, deflecting the evolution of 
society from the essential ideological principles behind 
economic planning.
7Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama (New York: Pantheon, 
1968), 1889.
12
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The Ideology
Post-independence economic planning in India was an 
attempt to right the wrongs of colonial rule as soon as 
possible. Nationalist leaders believed that capitalism 
could not solve the problem of directing investment to 
desired sectors, nor did they believe that free market 
forces could alleviate the chronic problems of poverty and 
unemployment that faced the country.8 Communism they saw 
as antithetical to India's newly won freedom. Inspired by 
the Soviet model of planned development and
industrialization, Jawaharlal Nehru and other Congress party 
leaders sketched a 'middle path' for India, values and 
objectives that have been summed up in the phrase 'socialist 
pattern of society'.9
A 'socialist pattern of society' meant that the basic 
criterion for determining the allocation of resources must 
not be private profit but social gain. The pattern of 
development and the structure of socio-economic relations 
should be so planned that they result in not only
8Jawaharlal Nehru and the other planners "thought 
of imperialism and capitalism as two faces of the Janus 
of our time and of nationalism and socialism as the two 
weapons of destruction" cited in Mike Shepperdson and 
Colin Simmons eds., The Indian National Congress and 
the Political Economy of India 1885-1985 (Hampshire, 
England: Gower Publishing Group, 1988), 272.
9For a fuller explanation see Government of India, 
Second Five Year Plan. (New Delhi: Planning Commission, 
1956) .
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appreciable increases in national income and employment, but 
also greater equality in incomes and wealth. As the economy 
grew, the benefits of economic development were to accrue 
more and more to the relatively less privileged classes of 
society and there was to be a progressive reduction of the 
concentration of wealth and economic power.10
In pursuit of these goals, the state had to assume the 
•commanding heights' of the economy; it had to take on heavy 
responsibilities as the principle agency speaking for and 
acting on behalf of the community as a whole. The public 
sector of the economy was to expand rapidly. It had not 
only to initiate development which the private sector was 
unwilling or unable to undertake; it had also to play the 
dominant role in shaping the entire pattern of investment in 
the economy, whether it made the investments directly or 
whether these were made by the private sector. The private 
sector had to play its part within the framework of the 
comprehensive plan accepted by the community. Private 
enterprise, private pricing and private management were 
considered mechanisms for the advancement of what were truly 
social ends and were thought to be justified only in terms 
of social results.
The development of a mixed economy with a strong public 
sector, particularly in the key areas of the economy, was
10For a summary of the Second Plan see Government 
of India, Approach to the Second Plan (New Delhi:
Planning Commission, 1956).
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viewed as an instrument for achieving the broader objectives 
of growth and equity.11 And, to realize these goals, the 
consequent neglect of consumer goods industries was seen as 
a necessary but temporary sacrifice. The argument was one 
of forced savings and self-reliance: "if you produced 
capital goods and steel, thus increasing the share of 
investment goods in GNP, that would automatically mean a 
higher savings rate since 'one cannot eat steel1."12 This 
was regarded as a feasible way to achieve a high rate of 
economic growth leading to improvement in living standards 
and reduction of inequalities. It was, in fact, an 
accelerated effort to remove poverty at a pace faster than 
would be achieved solely through the normal growth 
process.13
11The 'key areas' (also referred to as heavy, 
core, basic or priority industry) over which the state 
had almost complete monopoly included defence, 
railways, iron and steel, aircraft manufacture, ship­
building, communications, banking and, mineral oils. 
These areas involved large and lumpy investments and 
long gestation periods. Often, as with infrastructure 
facilities, benefits are in the form of externalities 
which cannot be easily and directly associated with the 
investment. However, these industries are a necessary 
prerequisite for a program of industrialization. Due 
to the scale of capital involved and the uncertainty 
regarding profitability, the state was the only agency 
in a position to undertake such investment.
12Jagdish Bhawati and Padma Desai, India: Planning 
for Industrialization (London: Oxford University Press, 
1970), 118.
13Sukhamoy Chakravarty, Development Planning: The 
Indian Experience (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 
ch. 1.
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The achievement of self-reliance has been an important 
objective of economic planning in India.14 The term itself 
is used in two senses. In one sense, self-reliance has 
meant that development must be financed as far as possible 
from domestic savings, avoiding excessive dependence upon 
external assistance, an inward looking strategy. Self- 
reliance has also meant a conscious effort to develop a 
broad domestic production base and indigenous technological 
capacity, both of which were felt to be essential 
requirements for building a strong industrialized economy, 
an import substitution strategy. And, all this was 
ultimately to lead to social and economic justice.
Planning, Policy and Policy Instruments
The Planning Commission was established in India on 
March 15, 195G. In the period since, it has formulated 
eight successive Five-Year Development Plans.15 The 
planning process has been 'rolling' in that there has been 
no abrupt or drastic reversal of ideology or strategy.
14For a more detailed discussion of the objectives 
of planning see Robert E.B. Lucas and Gustav F.
Papanek, The Indian Economy: Recent Developments and 
Future Prospects (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), ch.
16.
15There are two exceptions. In the wake of the 
serious food crisis of the 1960s, 1966-68 saw annual 
revisions to the Third Plan. Also, in 1977-79, the 
first non-Congress government broke away from the fifth 
Congress party plan. These two gaps in otherwise 
uninterrupted five-year plan periods have been labelled 
'plan holidays'.
17
There have been evaluations of policy and policy instruments 
and corresponding reappraisals of plan targets. Provision 
has been made to allow for such adjustments in annual 
budgets formulated within the framework of the overall 
plan.16
The broad objectives of industrial policy that have 
emerged from these strategies have been periodically 
reiterated in the Industrial Policy Resolutions of 1948,
1956 and 1973 and in the Industrial Policy statement of 
1980.17 The objectives included (1) increasing production 
and productivity, especially in the priority sectors, (2) 
encouraging small scale industries with a view to generating 
more employment and fostering entrepreneurial talents, (3) 
bringing about regionally balanced industrial growth, (4) 
preventing concentration of economic power by the control of 
monopolies and 'large' houses and, (5) controlling foreign 
investment in domestic industry.
The policy instruments deployed to guide 
industrialization into desired patterns included both 
domestic and foreign instruments.18 The domestic policy
16Features of Indian economic planning in fact 
correspond to those of Myrdal's 'ideal' plan. See 
Myrdal, 1878-1896.
17Isher Ahluwalia, Industrial Growth in India:
Stagnation Since the Mid-Sixties (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 147.
18For a detailed description see Bhagwati and 
Desai, ch. 13 & 14.
18
instruments consisted mainly of a powerful and comprehensive 
industrial licensing system, occasionally combined with 
prices and distributional controls.19 The rapid growth of 
the public sector also provided a significant means of 
influencing the pattern of new investments in the targeted 
direction. These policies were buttressed by policies 
relating to trade and payments. Industrial targets were 
supported by quantitative restrictions which automatically 
shielded domestic production from foreign competition? and 
the framework of import and export policies, in turn, 
provided the incentives which affected non-targeted 
industrialization.
Public Sector Performance
The public sector, as discussed above, occupies a 
hegemonic position in the Indian economy and its performance 
is central to the economic and political character that 
evolved in the country. It is important therefore, to take 
a short digression here and briefly discuss the outcome of 
state-guided industrialization. In keeping with the 
Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956, the scope of the
19There has been a vigilant evaluation of these 
instruments and, in the late sixties review of the 
industrial licensing system showed that the existing 
apparatus under the Industries Development and 
Regulation Act (1951) was not sufficiently effective in 
attaining its objectives. The Monopoly and Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act (MRTP) was enforced in 1970 to 
further check the expansion of large industrial houses. 
Ibid., 265-272.
public sector has been steadily increased in the plan 
periods since.20 This is evident from the investment and 
employment statistics shown in Tables I and II? they have a 
distinct anti-private sector bias. In spite of this, as 
figures on savings and capital formation suggest (see Table 
III), public sector performance has consistently fallen 
behind that of the private sector.
Table I
Compound Growth Rates of Gross Fixed Investment
Fixed Investment
Total Public Private
(in percentages)
1956-57 to 1965-66 6.1 10.0 3.2
1959-60 to 1965-66 9.0 9.9 8.2
1966-67 to 1975-76 2.9 3.3 2.6
1966-67 to 1979-80 4.1 5.2 3.1
1967-68 to 1975-76 2.8 4.2 1.9
1967-68 to 1979-80 4.0 5.8 2.8
Source: Isher Ahluwalia, Industrial Growth in India:
Stagnation since the Mid--Sixties (Delhi: Oxford Universi
Press, 1985).
Table II
Employment in the Organized Sector of the Indian
Economy
Private Sector Public Sector
(in percentages)
1961 41.7 58.3
1971 39.3 61.4
1981 32.3 67.7
Source: Isher Ahluwalia, Industrial Growth in India:
Stagnation since the Mid-Sixties (Delhi: Oxford University
20In 1960 there were 63 public sector undertakings. 
This increased to 1571 by 1980.
20
Press, 1985).
Criticism of the performance of public sector 
enterprises can be grouped most conveniently into those 
relating to investment or creation of capacity and those 
relating to output or capacity utilization.21 On the 
investment side, three major criticisms are that the actual 
costs of projects have by far exceeded the original 
estimates, that the projects have taken very much longer to 
complete and bring into operation than originally planned 
and, that they have embodied inappropriate technological or 
product mix.
Table III
National Savings and Capital Formation by the 
Government and Private Sectors.
Gross Domestic Gross Domestic
Savings Capital Formation
Govt. Pvt. Govt. Pvt.
(in percentages)
1950-55 18 82 32 68
1955-60 15 85 41 59
1960-65 24 76 49 51
1965-70 17 83 42 58
1970-75 18 82 41 59
1975-80 21 79 46 54
Source: Isher Ahluwalia, Industrial Growth in India: 
Stagnation since the Mid-Sixties (Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1985).
On the operational side, there are two criticisms of
21Pramit Chaudhari, The Indian Economy: Poverty 
and Development. (London: Crosby Lockwood Staples), ch. 
6.
21
fundamental importance. One is that low capacity 
utilization has failed to utilize optimally the scarce 
capital resources of the economy. The low, and declining 
capacity utilization ratios are shown in Table IV. Second,
Table IV 
Capacity Utilization Ratios
Industry Group 1960 1970 
(in ;
1980
percentages)
Basic Goods 86.0 82.0 77.2
Capital Goods 85.9 66.4 62.4
Intermediate Goods 89.3 81.9 82.5
Consumer Goods 86.6 82.2 80.1
Source: Isher Ahluwalia, Industrial Growth in India: 
Stagnation since the Mid-Sixties (Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1985).
the public sector industries have failed to make profits and 
have in fact accumulated substantial losses over the years, 
as can be seen in Table V. As a result, instead of being a 
source of re-investable surplus, India's public sector 
enterprises have become a source of negative savings in the 
economy. Failure of the public sector has caused severe 
shortages in the core sectors. Repercussions in the rest of 
the economy have resulted in a continued neglect of consumer 
goods and sluggish agricultural production, jeopardizing the 
entire development effort.
22
T a b le  V
Gross Public Sector Savings in the Economy
Consumption 
of fixed 
capital
Net Savings 
Financial Non Financial 
enterprises enterprises.*
(in Rs. crores)
1960-61 52 20 -9 (net)(11)
1961-62 71 21 -24 (-3)
1962-63 86 23 -23 -
1963-64 97 31 -5 (26)
1964-65 125 36 -23 (13)
1965-66 134 66 -16 (50)
1966-67 173 37 -38 (“1)
1967-68 214 54 -59 (-5)
1968-69 224 36 -57 (-21)
1969-70 290 53 -34 (19)
1970-71 337 84 -12 (72)
1971-72 394 93 -73 (20)
1972-73 445 145 -84 (61)
1973-74 361 204 -84 (120)
1974-75 553 336 83 (419)
1975-76 667 327 - 105 (222)
1976-77 814 503 98 (601)
1977-78 977 561 - 234 (327)
1978-79 1091 682 - 240 (442)
1979-80 1297 710 - 337 (373)
1980-81 1571 865 - 681 (184)
Source: Isher Ahluwalia, Industrial Growth in India: 
Stagnation since the Mid-Sixties (Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1985).
Non financial enterprises includes all public sector 
undertakings other than banking and financial institutions. 
The 'core1 industries would come under this category.
The State as an Autonomous Actor
In developing countries where private capital markets 
and insurance markets are inadequately developed, the state 
is the only agency that can provide capital and underwrite 
the risks involved in large initial investment ventures in
23
the early stages of industrialization.22 In India, the 
elites who inherited power at the time of independence 
shared a coherent ideology; they enjoyed enormous prestige 
and a unified sense of purpose about the desirability of 
using state intervention to promote national economic 
development. They redirected and restructured the economy 
and in the process, put pressure on existing prominent 
social and business classes. As the aura of special 
legitimacy derived from participation in the freedom 
movement waned (and as some of the widely respected leaders 
of the struggle for independence passed away), demands from 
vested interests could less easily be ignored. And today, 
"the autonomy of the Indian state is reflected more often in 
its regulatory and patronage-dispensing than developmental 
role."23
Robert Wade illustrates how selective incentives and 
complex understandings work among India's elite in his study 
of the pressures exerted by money and influence in the 
irrigation department.24 Wade suggests that there are two 
ways to secure an irrigation contract, for example. First, 
bribe the local MIA. (Member, Legislative Assembly at the
22Pranab Bardhan, The Political Economy of 
Development in India (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 
ch. 5.
23Ibid. , 39.
24Robert Wade, "Money-go-round," Economist. 4 May 
1991, p. S9.
state level) to use his influence on engineers in the 
administration. The amount of money involved depends on the 
scale of the contract. If the stakes are high and high 
level of authority is required to exert influence, the 
amounts in question will be high as well. The alternative 
would be to pay the engineers in the bureaucracy 'rent1 of 
post which gives them access to the appropriate official 
authority. Once again, the amounts involved depend on size 
of the contract and the level of bureaucrats and politicians 
whose cooperation is needed. In either case, for every 
irrigation contract, contractors, bureaucrats and 
politicians have a clear understanding and network to 
distribute the 'selective incentives'. In fact, such 
'complex understanding' among elites is estimated to support 
a parallel black economy during 1973-1982 of as high as half 
of the official GNP, with an annual compound rate of growth 
of 18%.25
Aside from the individual economic incentives that 
drive the 'complex understandings' in the system, there is 
also a political and partisan incentive involved, arising 
from the strategic requirement of funds in conducting a 
successful political campaign in a large democracy.
The infiltration of the official machinery has been 
made easier by the government's decision in 1968 to ban
25Report of the Wanchoo Panel cited in K. N.
Kabra, India's Black Economy and Maldevelooment (New 
Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1986), 67.
business concerns [from giving donations to political 
parties. The imm4diate motive of the Congress(I) party 
government was to deny funds to the opposition, notably, the 
Swantantra Party, which commanded a good deal of support 
from the industrialists in Bombay and Ahmedabad. But, more 
significant, it was not accompanied by any attempt to set up 
an alternative method of financing political activity and 
meeting election expenditures.26 As a result, with the
ever increasing needs for funds, all parties were forced to
f.
go back to the very same business concern and trade and
#
industrial associations to ask for funds but this time in 
black money. The move allowed the ruling party virtually to 
blackmail business concerns into meeting its demands on the 
one hand, and to set the law enforcement agencies on any 
concern which it suspected of giving funds generously to an 
opposition party. In the search for influence, this gave a 
decided edge to those whose control of their company's 
finances was so complete that they could raise black money 
easily: closely held Indian family concerns.27 In fact,
Prem Shankar Jha argues that the tirade against foreign 
equity participation arises as much from this concern as 
from any avowed leftist ideology or fear of foreign
26Prem Shankaf Jha, India: Political Economy of 
Stagnation (Bombay: Oxford University Press,1980),
114.
27In the 1980s, only four of the top twenty-five 
companies were foreign firms.
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domination.28
The governments apathy towards taxing the trading 
community springs too, at least in part, from its knowledge 
that when a manufacturer gives a donation in black it 
usually does so by collecting black from its selling agents. 
An illustration of this is the students revolt in Gujarat in 
February 1974. It was sparked by allegations of deals 
struck by a Congress Chief Minister with wholesale traders 
in edible oil which allowed them to rig the prices of 
groundnut oil in exchange for contributions to the state 
Congress party.29
Action in self-interest by the state at both the 
individual and partisan levels has had two significant 
implications for the economy in direct contradiction to what 
planned development was to achieve. The first has to do 
with the concentration of wealth and power in the private 
sector, which has been a specific target in all the 
Industrial Policy Resolutions. The second involves the 
unprecedented growth of the service sector.
In 1976 the top 20 business houses in India were 
reported to have controlled nearly two-thirds of the total 
productive capital in the private corporate sector.30 This
28 Jha, 115.
29Indian Express (New Delhi), 20 February 1974,
p. 1.
30Bardhan, 105.
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concentration of assets has not diminished in recent years 
as even the pretence of government control over monopoly 
houses was more gr less given up by the mid-70s.31 Another 
feature of the organization of industrial capital is the 
substantial expansion of small-scale industry and a possible 
increase in the incidence of subcontracting.32 Such 
arrangements not only help large companies avoid excise 
taxes and labor laws under the special provisions set up for 
cottage or small scale industry, they also line up for them 
a numerically strong vertical alliance that may prove useful 
in putting pressure on the government.
The intermediate class has grown stronger both 
absolutely and in relation to other classes and over time 
has used its growing economic strength to capture political 
power by means of bribery and political donations in black 
money to the ruling parties at the center and the states.33 
This service sector consists of those involved in retail, 
trade and transport. In his definition of modern economic 
growth, Simon Kuznets has argued that only in mature, 
developed economies does the tertiary sector compete with 
agriculture and industry for the dominant share of national
31Gita Piramal, "Industry Feels Worried," Financial 
Times (New York), 26 June 1992, p. XVI.
32Bardhan, 42.
33Atul Kohli, India1s Democracy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988), 15.
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income.34 In India, the service sector accounts for 39.6% 
of GNP while the share of agriculture is 37% and that of 
manufacturing 18%.35
In the Indian context, a prosperous service sector is 
parasitic in nature. Most of its members actually gain from 
shortages that are caused by economic stagnation or natural 
disasters. They have the capacity to shift the burden of 
these shortages onto other segments of society by, for 
example, raising transport and distribution margins in an 
economy. In consumer goods, such an artificial hike in 
prices poses a serious dilemma for the poor. Their demand 
for food is not translated into a market demand because it 
is not backed by the ability to pay, especially at inflated 
prices. They have simply been left out of the market 
process while the economy has been erroneously considered 
self-sufficient in food-grains for over a decade. As A. K. 
Sen points out this self-sufficiency is only a market 
phenomenon, it completely leaves out those most in need but 
without adequate purchasing power to have any entitlement in 
the market.36
34Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate. 
Structure and Spread (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1966) .
35Financial Times (New York), 26 June 1992, p. II.
36Amartya Kumar Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay 
on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford: Claredon Press, 
1981).
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Preservation of the Status Quo
In contemporary India, where the overwhelming 
majority are illiterates or drop-outs at the primary 
education level, the educated elite enjoy a high scarcity 
value for their education and profession. Further, the 
nature of state-directed development gave enormous strategic 
and bargaining advantages to officials with authority over 
development funds and influence over legislation. And such 
license-giving powers at various levels of the bureaucracy 
have made the rewards for corruption quite substantial. The 
bigger the rewards, the fiercer is the resistance of the 
'privilegensia1 to reform. The substantial benefits that 
economic planning affords them has made bureaucrats and 
politicians reluctant to relinquish control of the closely 
administered economy. A self-interested state has been very 
successful in guarding its 'commanding heights'.
Like the strongly and oft-professed socialist ideology, 
official declarations of liberalization in the economy have 
been unenthusiastically implemented. In a recent country 
survey, David Housego found that "Prime Minister Narashimha 
Rao's failure as a reformer stem from his reluctance to 
confront the powerful lobbies that have long resisted change 
in India."37 Significantly, he has had to put off promised 
reductions in the size of the civil service and the public
37David Housego, "Chances are slipping away'" Financial 
Times (New York), 26 June 1992, p. I.
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sector.
There is further evidence of interest protection in the 
manner in which the ranks of the state have been limited by 
directing educational investment away from the masses. A.
K. Sen has presented persuasive evidence of the elitist 
nature of the Indian education system by highlighting the 
remarkable success of higher education and relative neglect 
of elementary education.38 Achievements in improving 
literacy and primary school enrollment have been 
unimpressive. Literacy rates have increased from 24% to 
merely 36% in two decades (literacy among women remains as 
low as 20% in rural areas) and two-third of those enrolled 
in primary schools still drop out after only six years of 
education.39 The government has done little in terms of 
investment to improve the situation, between 1970 and 1990, 
expenditure on education has been increased from 2.5% to 3% 
($10 per capita) of GNP.40
38Higher education enrollment as a proportion of 
population aged 20-24 is 8%. However, the overall 
literacy rate is only 36%. In neighboring Sri Lanka, a 
country molded by the less elitist Buddhist tradition, 
the corresponding statistics are 1% and 85% 
respectively.
39In the same period, Malaysia increased literacy 
from 23% to 60%. See Economist, 4 May 1992, p. S8.
40In comparison, Malaysia spends 8.5% of GNP ($156 
a head) on education. Ibid., p. S15.
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Conclusion
State guided industrialization in India was intended to 
foster a fast growing egalitarian society. To this end, the 
extent and nature of autonomy the state has reserved for 
itself prompted Rudolph and Rudolph to label it the "third 
actor" in the economy (in addition to the usual components 
of economic analysis: the owners and managers of the means 
of production and organized labor).41 This advantage could 
have been exercised effectively to persuade adherence to a 
socialist ideology and the ultimate realization of planned 
development. However, Indian planners were not alert to the 
serious constraints on policy and implementation that could 
be posed by a failure of the large-scale, irreversible 
investments in the public sector and the articulate 
interests of the elite classes.
The failure of the public sector in fulfilling its
leading role in industry has caused severe supply side 
%
constraints and opened up potential black markets and 
illegal profits for shortage brokers. Restrictions on 
private initiative in industry in the presence of a large, 
unsatisfied demand for industrial and consumer goods has 
encouraged the violation of industrial regulations by large 
firms and a thriving black-marketeering practice in the 
service sector.
41Rudolph and Rudolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi 
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987), 388.
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The most crucial oversight was with respect to those 
who constitute the state, politicians and bureaucrats, who 
have willingly used the authority vested in them to promote 
illegal activities and who have been reluctant to make any 
policy revisions that might threaten their selective 
incentives. Jha argues that government servants and 
politicians have reserved for themselves more rights than 
any other section of society enjoys, while adding the least 
to the material productivity of the economy.42
Jha further suggests that as a result of illegal 
exercise of authority, there appears to be little balance 
between rights anci obligation in society.43 Or, As Olson 
might have put it, the incentive to produce is diminished 
while the incentive to seek a larger share of what is 
produced increases. And, far from being the benevolent 
state looking after the interests of the under-privileged, 
the question being asked of the Indian government today is 
"is it the law that rules, or black money?."44 In chapter 
III, an analysis of the emergence and nurturing of elitist 
interests in agriculture will further illustrate this point.
42 Jha, 123.
43Ibid. , 124.
44Clive Crook, Economist. 4 May 1991, p. S15.
Chapter III 
The Agriculture Sector
In Arthur Lewis' opinion "if one were asked to pick a 
single factor as the common cause for a low rate of economic 
growth, it would have to be the absence of a vigorous 
agricultural policy".45 This chapter explains the limited 
success of state intervention in altering the power 
structure in the agrarian sector. Three important policies 
aimed at redistributing productive assets and establishing 
economic and political equity in the rural economy are 
examined: panchavati rai. land reform and the Green 
Revolution. The analysis reveals that attempts at agrarian 
reform have actually provided additional selective 
incentives to the established network of social and 
political interests and these incentives have been actively 
pursued by the elites. The result has been the 
strengthening of the existing differentials in the community 
at the cost of the rural poor, the group which was targeted 
to benefit from reform policy.
Political Change: Panchayati Raj
The First Plan recommended establishing a new
45W. A. Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations. 1870-1913 
(London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1978), 241.
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development agency, the panchavats (councils), to frame and 
coordinate the planning and implementation of rural 
development projects.46 In fact, the Plan gave the 
panchavats statutory responsibility for developing all 
resources for the rural areas.47 Important among these 
responsibilities is the enforcement of land reform measures 
and the disbursement of development funds, a matter in which 
the panchavats enjoy nearly complete discretion.
Panchavats are organized at three levels: village (gram 
panchavats), block (mandal parishads) and district (zilla 
parishads). The village panchayat is constituted on the 
principles of universal membership and adult suffrage in an 
attempt to include all families in community development, 
regardless of caste or economic standing. Elections to the 
higher councils are indirect, with the village panchayats 
electing representatives to the mandal parishads and they in
46For a detailed account of Panchayati Raj 
(council rule) see First Five Year Plan. Also see Guy 
Hunter, The Administration of Agricultural Development: 
Lessons from India (London: Oxford University Press, 
1970).
47These responsibilities include (1)framing a 
production plan; (2)preparing budget estimates to carry 
out the plan; (3)acting as a channel for government 
assistance; (4)enforcing minimum standards of 
cultivation; (5)bringing wasteland under cultivation;
(6)arranging for cultivation of land not managed by 
owners; (7)organizing voluntary labor for community 
work; (8)making arrangements for cooperative management 
of land and other resources in the village according to 
prevailing land management legislation; and (9) 
assisting in the implementation of land reforms.
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turn electing the members of the zilla parishads.
Panchavati Rai (council rule) is intended to ultimately 
shift the balance of economic and political power away from 
the upper castes towards the low-status peasant majority. 
Francine Frankel has argued that in appointing panchayats as 
vehicles of democratic transformation at the grassroots, 
planners seriously misunderstood the potential of 
reconstructing the village as the basic unit of social 
action in rural areas.48 She argues that in the more self- 
contained and interdependent subsistence village economy, a 
network of patron-client ties bound together the high- 
landowning castes and low-caste tenants and laborers. This 
village cohesion, 'even at Independence, showed signs of 
erosion as a result of growing class differentiation and 
economic disparities. The more affluent members of the 
dominant landowning class had turned their resources to 
profitable new opportunities for participating in commercial 
farming provided by the wider market economy. They found 
fewer compelling reasons, either of economic interest or 
social status, t6 use their surpluses for meeting the 
traditional obligations of a self-sufficient village.49
i
48Francine Frankel, India's Political Economy.
1947-1977 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1978), ch. 13.
49For a detailed account of the disintegration of 
the traditional rural economy with the introduction of 
free trade under colonial rule, see Dharma Kumar, ed.,
The Cambridge Economic History of India (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983), section II.
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The much larger numbers of marginal farmers and 
landless laborers, still splintered along traditional 
allegiances to family, caste and faction, have found it 
difficult to present a united front against the larger 
landowners in the contest for control over the new community 
development bodies. Many landless and land-poor families
i
have been faced with an economic crisis that could be 
contained only by safeguarding even attenuated dependency 
relationships with more affluent members of the land owning 
class.50
In this environment, the richer landowners, already 
better placed in the village social hierarchy, have had 
little difficulty manipulating a fragmented and dependent 
peasantry to maintain control of the oanchavat 
institutions.51 From this vantage point, they are able to
50'Economic crisis' is in reference to the 
different impact new opportunities of a wider market 
economy have on a village community. The potential for 
profits is increased for the wealthy peasants and 
dominant classes through participation in a larger 
market system. The poor are without the resources to 
take advantage of or, guard against, the impersonal 
market forces that fluctuate demand and price. This 
makes their small earnings even more precarious. See 
Joel Migdal, Peasants. Politics and Revolution: 
Pressures Toward Political and Social Change in the 
Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1974) , 
ch. 1.
51Data available for Rajasthan, the first state to 
implement Panchayati Raj in 1959, revealed trends 
typical of an emerging all-India pattern. Compared to 
estimates showing over 68% of the rural population in 
Rajasthan having an annual income of less than Rs.1000,
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dictate the distribution of credit, improved methods of 
cultivation and marketing services. Their interest in 
augmenting their own resources has been assisted by the 
legislative provision of indirect elections to higher levels 
of the panchavati system which has allowed them to maintain 
a strong influence throughout the political hierarchy.
One visible effect of this expanding power is the 
growing ability of the district bosses in the Congress 
Party to insist on choosing the party's candidates for 
the state legislature and thus securing their influence 
over state legislation.52 Another is the increase in^  
the number of agriculturists in the Lok Sabha at the 
center from 10.7% in 1947 to 40.1% in the 1980 (see 
Table VI below). Evidence shows that their growing 
power has been consolidated all the way to the central 
government over the years. They have used this strong 
position to bargain for high procurement rates and low 
fertilizer prices for the agricultural sector.
85% of all presidents of village panchayats enjoyed an 
annual income of Rs.1000 or more. Although Scheduled 
Castes and Tribes accounted for approximately one 
fourth of the population of the state, only ten village 
panchavat presidents out of 7,394 belong to these 
communities. See David C. Potter, Government in Rural 
India: An Introduction to Contemporary District
Administration (London: London School of Economics and
Political Science, 1964), 53-55.
52R. Roy, "Selection of Congress Candidates" in 
Economic and Political Weekly (New Delhi), 18 Febuary 
1967, 409.
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Table VI 
Occupational Background of 
Congress Legislators in Lok Sabha
Occupational
Category
1947 1957 1967 1977 1980 
(in percentages)
Agriculture 10.8 24.1 36.8 36.3 40.1
Business 10.6 11.2 5.1 3.8 7.0
All Professions 
-Law 
-Other
50.4
(32.6)
(17.8)
30.4
(23.2)
(7.1)
35.9 
(22.2) 
(13.7)
32.2 
(20.1) 
(12.1)
30.2
(20.9)
(9.3)
Public Work 14.8 28.1 17.0 25. 3 20.1
Service 9.9 3.1 2.9 1.0 1.7
Others 3.5 3.1 2.3 1.4 0.9
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Parliamentary Study (New Delhi: Government of India 
Publication, 1982)
As part of the package of incentives and support 
extended to the agricultural sector to encourage increased 
market production, the government has placed subsidies on 
the price of inputs and guarantees a minimum price on 
agricultural products by promising to purchase all grain at 
a floor price announced before each season. A strong 
farmers* lobby at the center has compelled the government to 
over-subsidize inputs and over-compensate agricultural 
procurement.53 And any move to revise such policy, like
53See P. R. Dubhashi, Policy and Performance: 
Agricultural and Rural Development in Post-Independent 
India (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1986), ch. 8.
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the recent attempt to reduce fertilizer subsidy by the 
persent Prime Minister, is blocked by the strong 
agricultural lobby at all levels of government.54
The Nehru government's socialist ideology envisaged 
panchavats as the vehicle for "democratic social 
transformation... [and] a way to reverse the trend toward 
individualism and class division."55 However, under the 
existing socio-political conditions, the politics of 
accommodation represented by Panchavati Rai actually 
operated to strengthen the bargaining powers of the dominant 
castes. They have been able to strike advantageous 
alliances with the external sources of power in the ruling 
party and administration, which in turn further bolstered 
their strategic position as intermediaries between the land- 
poor peasantry and the wider economic and political system.
Social and Economic Change: Land Reform
At independence, the most important productive asset in 
rural India, land, was controlled by various contractual 
agreements between the British and the local landowners.56 
The common framework was the appointment of zamindars or 
landlords with assigned tracts of land from which they were 
responsible for collecting revenue for the British. In
54David Housego, Financial Times, p. I.
55First Five Year Plan. 164.
56Dharma Kumar, section II.
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return, they received a fixed portion or amount of total 
yield and were free to enter into any leasing or crop- 
sharing arrangement with tenant farmers who actually 
cultivated the land.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the First Plan 
initiated land reform with the slogan 'land to the tiller' 
and a strategy which had two main features.57 First, it 
placed a ceiling on individual holdings. Second, it gave 
tenants the right to buy land held in excess of the ceiling 
at fixed rates of compensation to the owner. This scheme 
had loopholes that consistently but lawfully left out the 
actual tiller of the soil from the redistribution process. 
Most significantly, ceilings were imposed on individual 
rather than family holdings. Further, the state paid a high 
rate of compensation for official acguisition of land over 
this limit, rates which tenant farmers found hard to match.
The land reform policy, as a result, permitted 
zamindars to reclaim land up to the ceiling permitted to 
each member of the family from the tenant who had previously 
cultivated it. Any surplus was sold to smaller farmers who, 
after counting the heads in their families, found they could 
still buy a good deal of land under the terms of the law. 
Finally, what little land was left after these adjustments 
was taken over by the erstwhile middlemen who had previously 
collected land rents from the peasants on behalf of the
57Jha, 111.
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zamindars. They were almost the only other people who could 
afford to pay the high rates of compensation fixed by the 
government. To safeguard against claims of hereditary 
tenurial rights, these three groups simply expelled all 
tenants, reemploying them as agricultural labor.
Data indicate that land for redistribution to marginal 
farmers has come from all other segments, contribution being 
an increasing function of the size of holding (see Table 
VII). Land reform has halved the share of large farms in 
total holdings and increased holdings at the bottom end of 
the scale to over 50%. However, statistics for operational 
holdings are not so favorable for marginal farmers; their
Table VII 
Landholding
Size of holdings Holdings percent Operational
(hectares) holdings (area %)
1953-54 1976-77 1953-54 1976-77
Marginal holdings
(below 1.0) 39.1 54.6 5.4 10.9
Small holdings
(1.0-2.0) 20.9 18.1 10. 0 12.8
Semi-medium holdings
(2.0-4.0) 19.7 14.3 18. 6 19.8
Medium holdings
(4.0-10.0) 14.4 10.6 29. 3 30. 3
Large holdings
(10 and above) 5.9 3.0 36.6 26.5
Source: The Cambridge Encyclopedia of India (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1989), p. 273.
lands add up to only 10.9% of the total. The combination of 
these two effects implies that reform has simply transformed
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a fraction of poor landless agricultural labor to land poor 
marginal farmers, still earning only a subsistence income. 
And, this earning invariably has to be supplemented by 
continued farm labor as marginal holdings are most 
susceptible to being economically infeasible (particularly 
in terms of irrigation in case of monsoon failure). Large 
and medium holdings, although their share has fallen (from 
65.9% to 56.8%), still account for the majority of 
operational agricultural area.
Thus, land reform in India, rather than protecting and 
promoting the cause of the tiller, allowed the consolidation 
of existing social and economic interests. Zamindars. the 
middlemen they had appointed and wealthy farmers now formed 
a new class of well-to-do owner-cultivators, reducing their 
tenants to marginal farmers or landless agricultural labor.
Technological Change: The Green Revolution
In the 1960s India faced two major food shortages that 
necessitated the import of substantial volumes of grain, 
depleting scarce foreign exchange reserves. This situation 
threatened the program of self-sufficiency and import 
substitution. Also, by the late 19 60s, it was clear that 
the land redistribution policy was not going to provide the 
solution to rural inequality. The Green Revolution offered 
a technical approach to the problems of an agrarian economy 
with low land-man ratios and low productivity.
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The basic characteristic of the new technology is the 
biological combination of a number of inputs which are 
complementary to one another.58 The combination of the 
joint inputs of hybrid seed, fertilizer and water yields 
much larger volumes of output by increasing yield per acre 
and allowing multiple cropping. Correctly implemented, the 
Green Revolution technology is neutral to scale; output per 
unit would not differ between large and small farms. There 
are however economic characteristics of the new technology 
that make it less than optimal to small and marginal farmers 
in the Indian political setting.
Crucial to the success of the high yield variety (HYV) 
seed is the timely and adequate application of water and 
fertilizer and, pesticide in areas prone to infestation.
For the capital-poor smaller farmer, the new technological 
package is more expensive albeit more productive. The state 
has placed subsidies on both credit and inputs. But, the 
regulations governing rural credit agencies set up to 
channel funds towards agricultural development virtually 
rule out giving credit to farmers with less than 7-10 acres 
of land.59 As Table VII suggests, this is probably less 
than 10% of total holdings. The practice of calling for
58B. M. Bhatia, Indian Agriculture: A Policy 
Perspective (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1988) 
ch. 6.
59Pranab Bardhan, Land. Labor and Rural Poverty.
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984) , 86.
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land as security, instead of offering loans secured by a 
lien on the crop, make credit inaccessible to all without a 
title to land than can be pledged. Private lenders, on the 
other hand, charge exorbitant rates of interest. Also, 
small farms are more sensitive to risk because they have 
smaller margins of savings to fall back on. However, 
government policy has done little to underwrite such risk.
So far as subsidized inputs are concerned, the elite classes 
receive preferential allotment by virtue of their domination 
of the panchayats, as discussed before.
Further, if yields from multiple cropping are to be 
maximized, the time interval between harvesting and planting 
is so short as to make it necessary to use tractors for 
preparation of land for sowing. Therefore, there is a 
strong tendency for the new technology to be associated with 
mechanization. This tendency has been strengthened by the 
government policy of underpricing of tractors and harvesters 
and the easy access large farmers have to subsidized 
agricultural credit. However, with the existing abundant 
labor force and high unemployment, mechanization can pose 
serious employment problems in India, the most immediate 
threat being to agricultural labor.
The success of India1s Green Revolution has been 
extremely limited in its spread, in terms of both area and 
grain. It has been largely restricted to wheat growing in 
the north and north-west of the country and to the rice
growing areas in the south. These regions have ideal, 
almost laboratory conditions, including the most fertile 
lands and an abundant natural supply of water. Farmers here 
were prosperous initially and required little 
infrastructural support in adopting the new technology. But 
even under these ideal natural conditions, government policy 
and policy implementation have prevented the Green 
Revolution from being profitable to the small and marginal 
farmers and hence being truly neutral to scale.
Table VIII is an international comparison of paddy 
yields under the Green Revolution technology among twelve 
Asian countries.60 Paddy/fertilizer ratio indicates input 
efficiency, the number of units of output produced by one 
unit of input. Green Revolution technology has increased 
this ratio in all the countries except three. (Of these 
three, Taiwan and Myanmar already had high ratios).
601 Paddy' refers to the entire plant before the 
rice grains are separated from it.
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Table VIII 
How green was your Revolution?
Paddy/ Fertilizer Paddy
fertilizer applied per yields
ratio hectare (kg/ha) (kg/ha)
1976 1981 1976 1981 1976 1981
India 0.17 0.37 32 34 1,637 1,962
(+325)
South Korea 0.65 0.84 311 351 5,966 5,841
(-125)*
Taiwan 1.25 0.75 205 287 4,539 4,953
(+414)
Indonesia 0.40 0.62 57 74 2,784 3,493
(+709)
Malaysia 0.49 0.56 97 92 2,733 3,225
(+492)
Philippines 0.28 0.27 29 32 1,821 2,362
(+541)
Thailand 0.24 0.30 11 18 1,780 If 952
(+272)
Bangladesh 0.51 0.57 11 44 1,784 1/955
(+171)
Myanmar 0.55 0.55 9 17 1,799 2,942
(+1143)
Nepal 0.33 0.45 8 9 1,891 2,000
(+109)
Pakistan 0.27 0.28 46 53 2, 347 2,604
(+257)
Sri Lanka 0. 60 0.83 65 77 1,971 2,646
(+675)
a case of decreasing returns to scale. 
Source: Economist. 4 May, 1991.
In India this increase has been substantial in absolute 
terms but because of the starting point, fertilizer 
efficiency remains low relative to other countries. 
Fertilizer applied per hectare indicates input intensity;
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the extent of fertilizer use. In India, fertilizer use has 
not increased significantly at all, neither absolutely nor 
relative to other countries. As a result, paddy yields in 
India have improved from the worst performance to third from 
bottom but only marginally so.
Evidence suggests that for Green Revolution technology 
to be successful, use of the new and efficient fertilizers 
must be combined with a high or increased intensity of use. 
This is evident from the increases in yield achieved by 
Myanmar, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Taiwan. For 
countries with yields below that in India, (Pakistan, Nepal 
and Thailand) either input effectiveness or input intensity 
or, both, have been significantly lower.61 Thus there is 
evidence to conclude that the potential gains from Green 
Revolution technology in India have been substantially 
limited by the failure to increase fertilizer intensity to 
ensure input effectiveness. A major factor here has been 
the pre-emptying of credit and inputs by the rural elite and 
the consequent curtailment of increased distribution and use 
of fertilizers.
61There appears to be only one exception to the 
rule. The Philippines has achieved a higher increase 
in paddy yields with both a lower paddy/fertilizer 
ratio and with lower amounts of fertilizer applied per 
hectare. Bangladesh is the other exception but is not 
considered here because of its special circumstance of 
persistent flood problems that effects paddy yields.
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Conclusion
In India, reform in agricultural policy has 
unquestionably strengthened the interests of the dominant 
class. It is not so much that these people join the elite 
when they establish themselves economically or politically, 
but that they typically come from that stratum already.
Using their social standing, the dominant class promoted 
itself to positions of political consequence in the 
panchavati rai system. Pre-emption of incentives extended 
to the sector at every level of social participation was 
facilitated by the panchavats being responsible for the 
distribution of development funds. As the new Green 
Revolution technology made agriculture a lucrative business, 
government credit, subsidies, inputs and guaranteed prices 
were pursued even more actively. Loopholes in the land 
reform policy prevented any significant redistribution of 
land in favor of the poor. Thus, the small and marginal 
farmer, with little physical capital and no social standing 
or political power, lost out in the race to secure the 
benefits of agricultural reform inspired by their situation 
and targeted specifically at them.
Chapter IV 
Conclusion
From his study of post-World War II western nations, 
Mancur Olson concluded that groups with access to selective 
incentives would try to capture a larger share of the 
national income. The accumulation of distributional 
coalitions, he argued further, increases the complexity of 
regulation, the role of government, the complexity of 
understanding and thus changes the direction of social 
evolution.
This thesis has extended Olson's theory to gauge the 
susceptibility of Third World democracies to the sort of 
coalition activity Olson describes. Evidence from the post­
independence development experience in India shows that 
society was indeed vulnerable to the economically 
debilitating effects of interest group and government 
interaction.
While the sequence of events in Olson's theory do not 
apply directly to the Indian case, all the operational 
attributes are clearly identifiable. In India, 
independence, democracy and industrialization all occurred 
simultaneously. Nationalist leaders, democratically 
elected after independence, framed a detailed economic plan 
for development. Spearheaded by state monopolized
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industrialization, growth was to be egalitarian and 
ultimately, establish a socialist way of life. This was the 
direction society was given.
The objectives and strategy of state-guided development 
necessitated a vast amount of legislation to monitor the 
economy and to ensure it kept on course. The power to 
frame, implement and revise this complex system of 
regulations was bestowed on elected politicians and a large 
army of bureaucrats. At the time of independence, these 
were the educated social elites of society. They did not 
join the ranks of the elites by gaining an education but, 
typically, they were born into socially high classes.
Planned development with its complexity of regulation has 
given the educated elite the opportunity to earn 'rent1 for 
their social standing by the illegal use of the authority 
entrusted to them. This is the 'selective incentive* these 
'specialists' have access to.
The private sector in India has found itself caught 
between complex government regulation on the one hand and 
excess demand in the market on the other. Much of the 
legislation arising from economic planning was to curb the 
growth of private enterprize in favor of the more desirable 
public sector enterprises. However, the failure of the 
latter to perform any where near the expected level has 
caused severe shortages in the economy. The private sector 
has used this as an incentive, profiting richly from an
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extensive and thriving blackmarket in essential goods, both 
intermediary and consumer. Further, it has influenced the 
implementation of the regulations against such practices by 
funding political activities or paying 'rent' to 
'specialists* to manipulate the law. The state has been 
able to preserve these selective incentives by continuing to 
endorse close regulation of the economy and, by biasing 
education policy toward higher education and thereby 
restricting entry into its ranks.
In agriculture, economic planning placed the 
distribution of development funds at the discretion of local 
elected authorities. This has been the greatest selective 
incentive for interest groups in this sector. Social elites 
have used their standing in village communities to capture 
political support and then proceeded to pre-empt subsidies 
assigned for the rural sector. To preserve the status-quo, 
they have successfully used their growing economic and 
political strength to promote themselves to higher levels of 
government and lobby even more effectively for their 
interests.
These are the 'complex understandings' the elites in 
India have come to in order to preserve and share the 
benefits of their positions. From this has resulted an 
alteration in the pattern of incentives. The incentive to 
produce is diminished, while the reward to seek a greater 
share of what is produced by exploiting politics and
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bureaucracy has become greater. And, all this has, as 
Olson's theory would have us predict, deflected the 
direction of a society's evolution. In India, the 
arrangement of power and authority among the elites has 
consistently left out the poor majority from the benefits of 
increased government intervention in the economy. In spite 
of a strongly professed socialist ideology, the elites have 
been fittest in terms of social, political and economic 
strength and have pre-empted concessions and incentives 
extended by the planning process at the expense of the poor 
majority.
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